Fraser, James D. (2020) 'The real problem with perturbative quantum field theory.', British journal for the philosophy of science., 71 (2). pp. 391-413.
The perturbative approach to quantum field theory (QFT) has long been viewed with suspicion by philosophers of science. This article offers a diagnosis of its conceptual problems. Drawing on Norton’s () discussion of the notion of approximation I argue that perturbativeQFTought to be understood as producing approximations without specifying an underlying QFT model. This analysis leads to a reassessment of common worries about perturbative QFT. What ends up being the key issue with the approach on this picture is not mathematical rigour, or the threat of inconsistency, but the need for a physical explanation of its empirical success.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx042|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The version of record Fraser, James D. (2020). The Real Problem with Perturbative Quantum Field Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71(2): 391-413 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx042|
|Date accepted:||17 March 2017|
|Date deposited:||24 April 2019|
|Date of first online publication:||28 June 2018|
|Date first made open access:||28 June 2020|
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