Professor Philip Goff philip.a.goff@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Conscious thought and the cognitive fine-tuning problem
Goff, P.
Authors
Abstract
Cognitive phenomenalism is the view that occurrent thoughts are identical with, or constituted of, cognitive phenomenology. This paper raises a challenge for (standard forms of) this view: the cognitive fine-tuning problem. In broad brushstrokes the difficulty is that, for the cognitive phenomenalist, there is a distinction between three kinds of fact: cognitive phenomenal facts, sensory phenomenal facts, and functional facts. This distinction gives rise to the challenge of explaining why, in actuality, these three phenomena tend to be matched together in ways that respect norms of rationality. Various solutions to this problem are explored – divine intervention, value-involving laws of nature, or basic capacities to respond to reasons – all of which are wildly at odds with naturalism. If cognitive phenomenalists want their view to be consistent with naturalism, as many do, they must come up with a naturalistic solution to the cognitive fine-tuning problem.
Citation
Goff, P. (2017). Conscious thought and the cognitive fine-tuning problem. Philosophical Quarterly, 68(270), 98-122. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx039
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | Aug 8, 2017 |
Publication Date | Aug 8, 2017 |
Deposit Date | Oct 18, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Mar 28, 2024 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Print ISSN | 0031-8094 |
Electronic ISSN | 1467-9213 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 68 |
Issue | 270 |
Pages | 98-122 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx039 |
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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record: Goff, P. (2017). Conscious thought and the cognitive fine-tuning problem. Philosophical Quarterly 68(270): 98-122, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx039
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