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Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions.

Li, Daniel and Xu, Minbo (2017) 'Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions.', Working Paper. Durham University Business School, Durham.


We study the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procurement auction. In our model, …rms are invited to the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat who runs the auction on behalf of a government may request a bribe from the winning …rm. We …rst present the over-invitation re- sults in the absence of corruption, in which more than a socially optimal number of …rms will be invited. Second, we show that the e¤ects of corruption on equilibrium outcomes vary across di¤erent forms of bribery. For a …xed bribe, corruption has no e¤ect on equilibrium competition, although it does induce social welfare loss. For a proportional bribe, a corrupt bureaucrat may invite fewer or more …rms to the auction depending on how much he weights his personal interest relative to the government payo¤. Thus, corruption may result in either Pareto-improving or dete- riorating allocations. Finally, we show that information disclosure may consistently induce more …rms to be invited, regardless of whether there is corruption.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
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Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:31 May 2019
Date of first online publication:2017
Date first made open access:No date available

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