James, Simon P. (2019) 'Suffering and the primacy of virtue.', Analysis., 79 (4). pp. 605-613.
Some people claim that some instances of suffering are intrinsically bad in an impersonal way. If it were true, that claim might seem to count against virtue ethics and for consequentialism. Drawing on the works of Jason Kawall, Christine Swanton and Nietzsche, I consider some reasons for thinking that it is, however, false. I argue, moreover, that even if it were true, a virtue ethicist could consistently acknowledge its truth.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record James, Simon P. (2019) 'Suffering and the primacy of virtue.', Analysis., 79 (4). pp. 605-613 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz049|
|Date accepted:||28 May 2019|
|Date deposited:||19 June 2019|
|Date of first online publication:||16 September 2019|
|Date first made open access:||16 September 2020|
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