Smith, B. (2006) 'Particularism, perception and judgement.', Acta analytica., 21 (2). pp. 12-29.
According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a 'perceptual' metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.
|Keywords:||Particularism, Epistemology, Perception, Presentism, Judgement, Similarities.|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1001-2|
|Publisher statement:||The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-006-1001-2|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||12 July 2016|
|Date of first online publication:||June 2006|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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