Lee, J. and Li, D.Z. (2019) 'Participation and welfare in auctions with default.', Economics letters., 183 . p. 108620.
In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through (i) the possibility of no trade and (ii) the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the model.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108620|
|Publisher statement:||© 2019 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/|
|Date accepted:||12 August 2019|
|Date deposited:||19 August 2019|
|Date of first online publication:||14 August 2019|
|Date first made open access:||14 February 2021|
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