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Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions

Kamei, K.

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Authors

K. Kamei



Abstract

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the community norms.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2020). Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 171, 234-246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.022

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 21, 2020
Online Publication Date Feb 12, 2020
Publication Date Mar 31, 2020
Deposit Date Jan 26, 2020
Publicly Available Date Aug 12, 2021
Journal Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Print ISSN 0167-2681
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 171
Pages 234-246
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.022
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1278797

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