Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.


Durham Research Online
You are in:

Potentiality : actualism minus naturalism equals platonism.

Giannini, Giacomo and Tugby, Matthew (2020) 'Potentiality : actualism minus naturalism equals platonism.', Philosophical inquiries., 8 (1). pp. 117-140.

Abstract

Vetter (2015) develops a localised theory of modality, based on potentialities of actual objects. Two factors play a key role in its appeal: its commitment to Hardcore Actualism, and to Naturalism. Vetter’s commitment to Naturalism is in part manifested in her adoption of Aristotelian universals. In this paper, we argue that a puzzle concerning the identity of unmanifested potentialities cannot be solved with an Aristotelian conception of properties. After introducing the puzzle, we examine Vetter’s attempt at amending the Aristotelian conception in a way that avoids the puzzle, and conclude that this amended version is no longer to be considered naturalistic. Potentiality theory cannot be both actualist and naturalist. We then argue that, if naturalism is to be abandoned by the actualist, there are good reasons to adopt a Platonist conception of universals, for they offer a number of theoretical advantages and allow us to avoid some of the problems facing Vetter’s theory.

Item Type:Article
Full text:Publisher-imposed embargo
(AM) Accepted Manuscript
File format - PDF (Copyright agreement prohibits open access to the full-text)
(677Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v8i1.278
Date accepted:21 August 2019
Date deposited:25 June 2020
Date of first online publication:31 March 2020
Date first made open access:No date available

Save or Share this output

Export:
Export
Look up in GoogleScholar