Eine Vergangenheit, die lieber vergessen wird? 
Scholarly Habitus-Forming, Professional Amnesia, and Postwar Engagement with Nazi Classical Scholarship

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ABSTRACT
This case study will take Volker Losemann’s recently published collection of essays titled Clio und die Nationalsozialisten and the (often far from complimentary) reception of his groundbreaking work on classics in the Third Reich since the 1970s as a starting point to reflect on wider discourses that have led to academic “forgetting” of this period in German classical scholarship.

In his recent overview of classical archaeology during the Third Reich, Stefan Altekamp has used the term “structural amnesia” to categorize the establishment attitude to remembering the Third Reich during the immediate postwar period. Altekamp argues that, until the 1980s, the period in question was either completely omitted from historical overviews and deemed irrelevant, or an erroneous conception of the discipline and its lack of adherence to Nazism was peddled—tantamount to a complete whitewash. Then, “throughout the 1980s, and even at the beginning of the 1990s, the disciplinary mainstream continued to cherish the understanding that (1) Classical Archaeology during the Nazi period did not produce anything novel, in contrast with the intellectually creative 1920s, (2) that it did not participate seriously in anything affirmative.

As a “forum” style think piece, this essay deliberately aims to provide a (necessarily brief) case study, focusing in particular on the work of Volker Losemann and his recently published collection of essays, rather than providing an exhaustive survey of the trend in question. Since the piece was submitted for publication, further literature has appeared which may be useful to those with an interest in pursuing these ideas further, including Roland Färber and Fabian Link, eds., Die Altärtumswissenschaften an der Universität Frankfurt 1914–1950: Studien und Dokumente (Basel: Schwabe, 2019); and Michael Sommer and Tassilo Schmitt, eds., Von Hannibal zu Hitler: ”Rom und Karthago“ 1943 und die deutsche Altertumswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2019).
with respect to Nazi ideology, (3) that it differed from Prehistory and Ancient History in keeping its distance from the regime, and (4) that it was subjected to a constant threat of being oppressed by the cult of the ‘Aryans.’ Four assumptions, four legends.”

The trend in the history of ancient historical scholarship seems to have been broadly similar. The first major monograph on ancient historians under National Socialism, Volker Losemann’s *Nationalsozialismus und Antike*, which is still the standard work today, only appeared in 1977. In a recently published volume reprinting many of Losemann’s seminal essays on the history of university politics and classical and ancient historical scholarship during the Third Reich, titled *Klio und die Nationalsozialisten*, we find repeated references, both in the encomiastic prefatory material by the editors and by Losemann’s colleague Hans-Joachim Drexhage, to the *Mauer* (wall) or *Deckmantel des Schweigens* (mask of silence) that characterized German scholars’ attitude toward this period.

Broadly speaking, during the decades following the end of the Second World War (at least as far as the Federal Republic is concerned), classical scholars and ancient historians in Germany refused to engage with the idea that they might bear any guilt concerning their complicity with the Nazi regime. In his privately published *Personal Memories*, Viktor Ehrenberg (1891–1976), a Jewish émigré ancient historian who had made his career in England after having fled Germany in 1939, recalled that at the first postwar conference of German ancient historians and classical scholars in September 1949, his willingness to build bridges with former colleagues and cast aside the darkness of the intervening decade was welcomed and that “no revival of Nazism seemed possible, but there was comparatively little feeling of guilt.” Later, in a review published in 1958, Ehrenberg himself suggested that it would be best to let the recollection of his former

4. Matters in the German Democratic Republic took a rather different (though in some ways no less problematic) turn, inasmuch as research by scholars such as Johannes Irmscher into the history of Nazified classical scholarship was portrayed as rescuing the discipline from its fascist past; however, such research was itself ideologically loaded, tending to dismiss all past work as the flawed product of *bürgerliche Geschichtsschreibung* (bourgeois historiography). It is perhaps telling that Fritz Altheim (1898–1976) was able to get more than one volume of his *Krise der Alten Welt*, a publication originally sponsored by the SS-Ahnenerbe, reprinted in the Soviet Zone of Occupation/German Democratic Republic; only the Ahnenerbe decorations and Himmler’s prefatory foreword (as “Reichsführer-SS”) were removed in the new edition (Losemann, *Klio und die Nationalsozialisten*, 164–65).
colleagues’ “prostitution of scholarship, of which the authors must by now feel deeply ashamed . . . sink into oblivion.”6 However, the reporter who covered the conference for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* at the time, Walter Rüegg, took a rather harsher line, commenting that the future of the discipline appeared bleak indeed when professors who had made substantial concessions to the Nazi regime, such as Josef Vogt of Tübingen (1895–1986) and Fritz Taeger of Marburg (1894–1960), were allowed to hold the floor once again, as if the mere fact of their de-Nazification had unproblematically cleansed them of all complicity.7

In his survey “Nationalsozialismus und Antike: Bemerkungen zur Forschungsgeschichte,” Losemann suggests that one might speak of a revisionist literature of the early postwar years, in which the *Irrweg* (erroneous path) of Nazified historiography could comfortably be castigated, bolstered by the prevalent idea that upstart teachers and “outsiders” had taken over the historical discipline against the will of its established members.8 Works on the Nazification of academia by scholars such as Max Weinreich, Helmut Heiber, Michael Kater, and Reinhard Bollmus might mention ancient historians in passing, but it was Marburg professor Karl Christ (1923–2008), Losemann’s doctoral supervisor, who was the first to engage systematically with the history of *Altertumswissenschaft* under National Socialism.9 However, when Christ applied to the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (German Research Council) for funding for a project on this topic in the late 1960s, the reaction was instant and unequivocal; it took less than a week for Christ’s application to be summarily rejected.10 Losemann was able to deduce

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10. For a sketch of the project’s putative content, which promised to define the personal fate and political engagement of leading ancient historians; the significance of intellectual, religious, social and
from his own personal research at a later juncture that the grant proposal itself must have been the subject of heated oral discussion, due to the lack of written documentation surrounding its incredibly swift rejection. He concludes that "there is no question that the responsible peer reviewers made their decision completely in accordance with the prevailing consciousness and interests of the majority of their colleagues. The affair fits the established picture; it corresponds with the typical—and much criticised—behavioral patterns of the older generation of historians. But it also proves that there were relatively early attempts and initiatives [to bring this disciplinary history to light], which were permitted no possibility of success."¹¹

This problem was exacerbated by the “double career” phenomenon, whereby ancient historians such as Josef Vogt and Helmut Berve (1896–1979) were able to continue their professorial careers unproblematically in the German Federal Republic. Karl Christ saw Berve as the personification par excellence of this troubling trajectory: the former Beauftragte für den Kriegseinsatz der Altertumswissenschaften (war representative for classical scholarship) led the Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik (Commission for ancient history and epigraphy) between 1960 and 1967, and his book on Sparta (1937), intended for a popular audience, and replete with Nazified ideological tropes, was reprinted with scarcely a redaction in 1966.¹² Of course, the setback over funding did not prevent Christ from using material on classics and ancient history under Nazism in his seminars or from building up collections of relevant sources at Marburg University. Nevertheless, the resulting dissertations and theses were often greeted with perturbation or anxiety by his disciplinary colleagues, often leading to their engaging Christ in concerned conversations over the telephone.¹³

Losemann also mentions the “grotesque” conditions that he encountered when attempting to gain access to relevant archival material while researching his own dissertation


¹³. Losemann, Klio und die Nationalsozialisten, 168.
on the theme of ancient historians under National Socialism, and the politicized dissent among his peer reviewers that occurred when the finished doctoral thesis was being assessed for publication. One reviewer claimed that “the entire subject ought to be somewhat relativised. . . . [Fritz] Altheim’s ‘war service’ scarcely alters the fact that block wardens were far more influential and capable of shaping public opinion under National Socialism than all the professors of ancient history put together.” Stefan Rebenich has interpreted this episode as a paradigmatic example of the widespread embargo on any form of discourse that explored ancient historians’ relationship with Nazism. Indeed, a glance at the comprehensive bibliography compiled by Beat Näf at the turn of the millennium demonstrates that it was only in the 1980s and 1990s that scholarship on the topic became widespread—while Losemann notes that the 1990s also saw a “sharpening” and “radicalization” of the research questions that were being put forward, as well as a greater willingness to engage critically with the work of fully paid-up Nazi ancient historians, such as Hans Oppermann.

Works by Beat Näf, Cornelia Wegeler and Diemuth Königs paved the way for this new, more open approach—yet the question of what would have happened if the scholars under investigation by this new generation of researchers had still been alive remains open. Vogt, the subject of Diemuth Königs’s monograph, for instance, not only kept quiet about his Nazi past, but also actively hindered its exploration. Some former students still attempted to protect their father figures, or even hide relevant or potentially incriminating material—such as the acolytes of the Berlin ancient historian Wilhelm Weber (1882–1948), who demanded that retired professors’ widows return all the letters


15. Stefan Rebenich, ”Nationalsozialismus und Alte Geschichte: Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in Forschung und Lehre,” in Elisabeth Charlotte Welskopf und die Alte Geschichte in der DDR, ed. Isolde Stark (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005), 42–64, discussion at 64.


that he had once sent them. Nevertheless, cooperation by the Enkelgeneration (i.e., the generation of [scholarly] grandchildren) has often proved rather less problematic, as Stefan Rebenich’s work on Helmut Berve’s past can testify.

In general terms, we can see that debates about the appropriateness or otherwise of leaving the history of ancient historical and classical scholarship under the Third Reich to rot in oblivion were largely determined by overlapping personal and political factors. The personal element was usually motivated by self-interest; Doktorväter (doctoral supervisors, literally “doctor fathers”) were hardly likely to welcome critical investigations by younger students into their own questionable pasts or, later, the pasts of their own supervisors and mentors—in a watered-down form, this is still a phenomenon that has not yet completely vanished. Losemann has pointed to a deep-seated unwillingness among former students to symbolically murder their scholarly fathers—perhaps we might suggest that such tendencies have been heightened by the extremely paternalistic relationship that still pertains between doctoral students and their supervisors in Germany (as symbolized by the term Doktorvater itself). Former doctoral students’ own self-interest would also have had a crucial role to play, however, for what scholar in the prime of their career would wish publicly to acknowledge a former Nazi sympathiser as their academic protector, patron, or sponsor?

The political element, meanwhile, appears more mutable and complex, mirroring the variety of attitudes and shifting engagements with German Vergangenheitsbewältigung (attempts to master the past) during the postwar years and beyond. Key milestones of cultural memory such as the Historikerstreit (historians’ debate), the Goldhagen debate, and the Frankfurt Historikertag in 1999, all played their role in causing scholarly attitudes to change, while not necessarily making a great deal of difference to the ingrained political convictions of individual academics.

Even today, however, there remain gaps and black holes in our knowledge; topics that we would expect to have been covered before now yet that remain untouched; cases of young scholars writing a monograph on a topic and then leaving academia, possibly because they touched on a subject that is still to a certain extent taboo among the older professoriate. An interesting example of this phenomenon might be Barbara Stiewe’s

21. See Schulze and Oexle, Historiker.
monograph on the third humanism, Der “Dritte Humanismus”: Aspekte deutscher Grie-
chenrezeption vom George-Kreis bis zum Nationalsozialimus, which appeared in 2011 with De Gruyter. In her introduction, Stiewe comments that there has been a great re-
luctance to engage with the phenomenon of the “Third Humanism,” as peddled by Wer-
ner Jaeger, Eduard Spranger, and the George Circle, in contrast with Renaissance hu-
manism and neohumanism. She ascribes this neglect to the general perception of the
Third Humanism as too much oriented toward realpolitik, too chauvinist, and betray-
ing (supposedly) too great an affinity with National Socialist thought (though in fact
she is able to make a good case for its being much further from Nazi Denkmuster [par-
adigms] than one might have suspected). It has therefore, in her own words, been
doomed to the fate of “collective forgetting.”

So, where does this (brief and necessarily inexhaustive) survey of the state of the dis-
cipline leave us—and how does it fit in with more general reflections on scholarly for-
getting or the nature of scholarly oblivion? It seems clear that, if we take Brigitte
Schlieben-Lange’s model of academic amnesia, we are looking at a straightforward case
of those types of forgetting that require conscious effort—some form of censure or re-
pression. If we are distinguishing between intentional and unintentional forgetting, then
what we see in the immediate postwar period are concrete attempts to prevent knowl-
edge about certain aspects of the disciplinary past from reaching the public (or even the
scholarly) domain.

If we conceive of the scholarly community within a nation as bearing some of the
traits that we can ascribe to the “imagined community” of the nation as a whole—as
Katherine Harloe has suggested in her recent monograph on Winckelmann and his re-
ception—then we might also subscribe to Aleida Assmann’s idea, blending Maurice
Halbwachs and Nietzsche, that “national memory is commonly ruled by pride or the
memory of its own suffering, while recollection of one’s own guilt is scarcely admissible.”
Assmann would presumably site this instance between the poles of what she terms

22. Barbara Stiewe, Der “Dritte Humanismus”: Aspekte deutscher Grie-
23. See Brigitte Schlieben-Lange, “Vom Vergessen in der Sprachwissenschaftsgeschichte: Zu den
Forgetting in the History of the Humanities: Starting Points for Discussion,” History of Humanities 5,
24. Katherine Harloe, Winckelmann and the Invention of Antiquity: History and Aesthetics in the
25. “Das nationale Gedächtnis wird gemeinhin von Stolz oder der Einernerung an eigenes Leiden
regiert, während die Erinnerung an eigene Schuld nur schwer Einlass findet” (Aleida Assmann, Formen
des Vergessens [Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016], 48). For more on this, see also Aleida Assmann, Der lange
selective forgetting) and defensive forgetting. In this context, affected individuals and groups are imposing forgetting upon themselves (Vergessenwollen) but they are also hoping to make others forget (Vergessenmachen). There is certainly an “oblitiating force” at work here—the body of knowledge in question is perceived as dangerous and undesirable, leading to the formation of a taboo.

But why does this particular subject have what appears to be such a high Vergessenpotential (potential for being forgotten)? Yes, it could certainly be regarded as posing a risk to certain dominant cultural, political, or ideological concerns; one could usefully cite the Nietzschean aphorism on cognitive dissonance as a gloss: “Memory says, ‘I did that.’ Pride replies, ‘I could not have done that.’ Eventually, memory yields.”26 And, as the general intellectual or cultural climate changed, along with the distance in time from the Nazi past, it is surely unsurprising that the “potential for forgetting” would also change, and the taboo begin to break down. However, perhaps even more importantly, we appear to have a strong moral forcefield acting here; an imperative that demands remembrance, when many scholars who were directly involved with the period at issue would arguably prefer to forget.

From this perspective, I wish to conclude with some more anecdotal reflections from my own experience, which nevertheless mesh well with the introductory observations conceived by Han Lamers, Toon Van Hal, and Sebastiaan G. Clercx on amnesiological patterns, which they have defined as “omissions and silences that are reproduced socially, namely, through communication between individuals or networks of scholars, and thus constitute structural ‘blind spots’ that are in need of an explanation beyond the psychopathological level of blocked individual memory.” These can include ways in which “scholars, in the process of scholarly communication, discard knowledge that, at least to us, seems relevant to their work and to have been principally accessible to them.”27 If each instance of scholarly forgetting should “be understood against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic interplay between Vergessenpotential and the working context, or habitus,” as the authors argue, then it may also be helpful to take a brief look at how habitus-forming might work in practice, through the attitudes that older scholars

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27. Lamers et al., “How to Deal with Scholarly Forgetting.”
display when speaking to younger scholars about scholarly research on the Nazi past and Nazified classical scholarship.

My first experience of this kind was a conversation with Stefan Rebenich, which took place when he was giving me some advice on my MPhil thesis in May 2008, prior to submission in June of that year. In connection with Volker Losemann’s magnum opus, Nationalsozialismus und Antike, Rebenich mentioned that the considerable furore that it had caused within the discipline in Germany meant that, if Losemann had not already had tenure at Marburg, he would have been completely ousted from the academic world and cold-shouldered at every turn. Rebenich claimed that this was why Losemann has never received a professorship, despite his important—and groundbreaking—work in the field of Nazi intellectual history. This makes complete sense in terms of the chronology; as we have already seen, Losemann published Nationalsozialismus und Antike at a point when Vergangenheitsbewältigung was still pretty much unknown, particularly in academic institutions, and arguably many of his colleagues simply deemed that he was fouling his own nest, rather than respecting the struggles and supposed victimhood of his colleagues.

The second anecdote relates to Werner Jaeger’s notorious article “The Education of the Political Man and Antiquity,” published in the Nazi periodical Volk im Werden in 1933 after Hitler’s seizure of power. Katie Fleming has dubbed this “a straightforward exercise in academic opportunism, an attempt to convince the new regime of the compatibility of [Jaeger’s] Third Humanism with the aims of the [Nazi] Party”—which seems a fairly uncontroversial judgment, given the article’s content. It has been more or less incontrovertibly established that, in writing the piece, Jaeger wished to ingratiate himself with the National Socialist education minister Bernhard Rust (1883–1945), in the hope that his ideas on neo-Greek paideia might become influential in Hitler’s new Germany.


29. Indeed, in intellectual history, Losemann is often hailed himself as a sort of founding father—for instance, in Wolfgang Bialas and Anson Rabinbach’s introduction to their edited volume on Nazi Germany and the Humanities (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007).


However, whenever (both as a doctoral student, and beyond) I mentioned the pro-Nazi sympathies displayed by Jaeger to other older classicists, whether in person or in writing, my interlocutors were immediately affronted and rallied round to defend Jaeger’s reputation by referring to all the wonderful things that he had done after emigrating to the United States. While not attempting to deny all of that, I found it strange that older classical scholars were generally so unprepared to confront Jaeger’s previous, Nazi-sympathetic credentials. If the Nazi movement had been prepared to accept the Third Humanism into their Weltanschauung, and used Jaeger as a glamorous academic poster boy, might he have been more tempted to stay in Germany? It appears that this is not something that, as a classicist, one is supposed to consider, whereas it would seem a fairly uncontroversial counterfactual from a modern-historical standpoint.

Finally, in 2014, in connection with my work on National Socialist educational periodicals, I elicited some advice from an older German scholar (who had previously written several hard-hitting articles on Nazi classics professors). He was extremely concerned that many of the people who wrote for the National Socialist Teachers’ League classics journal that I was analyzing, Die Alten Sprachen, should not be defined as classicists because they were by no means “top rank scholars” or did not possess a doctorate. He even made the same complaint about Education Minister Rust, a classicist by training, stating that Rust was surely just a mere “Gymnasium teacher.” On another occasion, however, the scholar in question told me that I must always mention when authors were braver Gymnasiallehrer (good Gymnasium teachers) after 1945; the idea seemed to be that you were worthy of being termed a classicist if you went on to publish humanistic articles in Der Altsprachlicher Unterricht in the postwar period, but not if you had only published Nazified articles in Die Alten Sprachen.

Again, it seemed odd to me that there was such an obvious defensiveness at play here, and a strong desire to overwrite the memory of peccadillos committed during the Nazi era by referring to people’s “good behavior” afterward—it did not appear as if the past were being completely mastered here. Yet, had I continued my career as a classicist and ancient historian, rather than making the transition into modern history, it would have been easy to internalize these warnings off pursuing a touchy topic, accept these strictures as part of the scholarly habitus of the discipline, and focus my attention elsewhere.

34. Personal correspondence with J. M., January 2014. This attitude correlates interestingly with previous tendencies to blame teachers and “outsiders” for Nazifying the discipline, as mentioned above.
In conclusion, then, this case study arguably raises some important questions—for instance, who do we believe deserves recollection or oblivion within the context of an individual discipline, and why? Should certain episodes of particular scholars’ careers be deliberately remembered or forgotten? How far should moral reasoning play a role in our judgment, and in our determination of research topics (as well as our desire to discover a relatively untrodden path)? And, crucially, what role does interpersonal subjectivity have to play?

Finally, the specific cases of Karl Christ and Volker Losemann also point toward the significance of modern funding mechanisms in today’s grant-led research landscape when it comes to the potential obliviation of scholarly ideas. After all, even bibliographical items that remain uncited can be discovered far more easily than the remnants of proposed projects which were never given the chance to generate any bibliography at all.

**WORKS CITED**


35. In this context, it might be interesting to note that one of the peer reviewers for a major German funding body took such swift (and not wholly substantiable) exception to the author’s own proposal for a research project on the Nazification of classics teaching during the Third Reich, submitted in 2015, that the application was inevitably turned down as a result—a circumstance which might also seem suggestive of some Teutonic scholars’ reluctance to engage with such topics, even in the twenty-first century.


