Cookies

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.


Durham Research Online
You are in:

Natural name theory and linguistic kinds.

Miller, J. T. M. (2019) 'Natural name theory and linguistic kinds.', Journal of philosophy., 116 (9). pp. 494-508.

Abstract

The natural name theory, recently discussed by Johnson (2018), is proposed as an explanation of pure quotation where the quoted term(s) refers to a linguistic object such as in the sentence ‘In the above, ‘bank’ is ambiguous’. After outlining the theory, I raise a problem for the natural name theory. I argue that positing a resemblance relation between the name and the linguistic object it names does not allow us to rule out cases where the natural name fails to resemble the linguistic object it names. I argue that to avoid this problem, we can combine the natural name theory with a type-realist metaphysics of language, and hold that the name is natural because the name is an instance of the kind that it names. I conclude by reflecting on the importance of the metaphysics of language for questions in the philosophy of language.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Download PDF
(214Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116930
Date accepted:29 March 2019
Date deposited:29 July 2020
Date of first online publication:01 September 2019
Date first made open access:29 July 2020

Save or Share this output

Export:
Export
Look up in GoogleScholar