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The non-existence of ontological categories : a defence of Lowe.

Miller, J. T. M. (2016) 'The non-existence of ontological categories : a defence of Lowe.', Metaphysica., 17 (2). pp. 163-176.

Abstract

This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2016-0012
Publisher statement:The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:29 July 2020
Date of first online publication:08 September 2016
Date first made open access:29 July 2020

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