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Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships

Kamei, Kenju

Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships Thumbnail


Authors

Kenju Kamei



Abstract

Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this article finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanisms (JEL C92, D72).

Citation

Kamei, K. (2021). Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 37(2), 392-439. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa020

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 10, 2020
Online Publication Date Dec 14, 2020
Publication Date 2021-07
Deposit Date Aug 18, 2020
Publicly Available Date Mar 28, 2024
Journal Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Print ISSN 8756-6222
Electronic ISSN 1465-7341
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 37
Issue 2
Pages 392-439
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa020
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1258394

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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of law, economics, & organization following peer review. The version of record [Kamei, Kenju (2021). Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 37(2): 392-439] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa020




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