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Introduction.

Cowie, Christopher and Rowland, Richard (2020) 'Introduction.', in Companions in guilt : arguments in metaethics. London: Routledge , pp. 1-16.

Abstract

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book aims to distinguish between two kinds of companions in guilt strategy: by analogy, and by entailment. It explores the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and argues that proponents of guilt argument assume that the error theory is comprised of a single argument. The book provides one of the first sustained discussions and critiques of Terence Cuneo’s illocutionary companions in guilt argument. It also argues that if epistemic normativity can be analysed in terms of truth, then prudential normativity can be analysed in terms of pleasure. The book discusses the prospects for companions in guilt arguments that take aesthetic judgments or properties as a companion for their moral counterparts. It shows that a version of guilt argument based on the metaphysics of the thick evaluative or on what it is to understand thick evaluative concepts fails.

Item Type:Book chapter
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429454677-1
Publisher statement:This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Companions in guilt : arguments in metaethics on 24 September 2019, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9780429454677
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:01 September 2020
Date of first online publication:24 September 2019
Date first made open access:24 March 2021

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