Cowie, Christopher (2022) 'A new argument for moral error theory.', Noûs, 56 (2). pp. 276-294.
Abstract
Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Full text: | (AM) Accepted Manuscript Download PDF (260Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357 |
| Publisher statement: | This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cowie, Christopher (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs 56(2): 276-294, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. |
| Date accepted: | No date available |
| Date deposited: | 21 October 2020 |
| Date of first online publication: | 20 October 2020 |
| Date first made open access: | 20 October 2022 |
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