Cowie, Christopher (2022) 'A new argument for moral error theory.', Noûs, 56 (2). pp. 276-294.
Traditional arguments for moral error theory are based on identifying a problem with the metaphysics of moral properties. I provide a new argument that is based on the inconsistency of first‐order moral judgments. I illustrate this using impossibility results in population axiology.
|Full text:||Publisher-imposed embargo until 20 October 2022. |
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357|
|Publisher statement:||This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cowie, Christopher (2022). A new argument for moral error theory. Noûs 56(2): 276-294, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12357. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||21 October 2020|
|Date of first online publication:||20 October 2020|
|Date first made open access:||20 October 2022|
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