Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?

Goff, P.

Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?

Goff, P.

Authors

Professor Philip Goff philip.a.goff@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

Frankish's argument for illusionism -- the view that there are no real instances of phenomenal consciousness -- depends on the claim that phenomenal consciousness is an 'anomalous phenomenon', at odds with our scientific picture of the world. I distinguish two senses in which a phenomenon might be 'anomalous': (i) its reality is inconsistent with what science gives us reason to believe, (ii) its reality adds to what science gives us reason to believe. I then argue (A) that phenomenal consciousness is not anomalous in the first sense, and (B) the fact that phenomenal consciousness is plausibly anomalous in the second sense is only problematic if it can be shown that our introspectively-based reasons for believing in consciousness are epistemically problematic. I finish by suggesting that Frankish might be motivated to adopt radical naturalism because he takes doing so to be the appropriate response to the incredible success of natural science. I outline a way of thinking about the history of science which undermines this motivation.

Citation

Goff, P. (2016). Is realism about consciousness compatible with a scientifically respectable world view?. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23(11-12), 83-97

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Jan 1, 2016
Publication Date	2016-01
Deposit Date	Oct 25, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Nov 24, 2020
Journal	Journal of Consciousness Studies
Print ISSN	1355-8250
Publisher	Imprint Academic
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	23
Issue	11-12
Pages	83-97
Publisher URL	https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2016/00000023/f0020011/art00007