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Panpsychism and free will : a case study in liberal naturalism.

Goff, Philip (2020) 'Panpsychism and free will : a case study in liberal naturalism.', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society., 120 (2). pp. 123-144.

Abstract

There has been a resurgence of interest in panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. According to its supporters, panpsychism offers an attractive solution to the mind–body problem, avoiding the deep difficulties associated with the more conventional options of dualism and materialism. There has been little focus, however, on whether panpsychism can help with philosophical problems pertaining to free will. In this paper I will argue (a) that it is coherent and consistent with observation to postulate a kind of libertarian agent causation at the micro-level, and (b) that if one if believes in libertarian agent causation at the macro-level, there are significant advantages in also postulating its existence at the micro-level.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009
Publisher statement:This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Proceedings and the Aristotelian Society following peer review. The version of record  Goff, Philip (2020). Panpsychism and Free Will: A Case Study in Liberal Naturalism. Proceedings and the Aristotelian Society 120(2): 123-144 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa009
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:24 November 2020
Date of first online publication:20 July 2020
Date first made open access:20 July 2021

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