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Real acquaintance and physicalism.

Goff, P. (2015) 'Real acquaintance and physicalism.', in The nature of phenomenal qualities : sense, perception & consciousness. Oxford : Oxford University Press.


‘Real acquaintance’ is a special kind of intimate relationship subjects bear to their phenomenal qualities, in virtue of which: (i) a psychologically normal subject can know the real nature of one of her phenomenal qualities by attending to that quality, (ii) a psychologically normal subject is able to put herself into a situation in which, with respect to one of her phenomenal qualities, she is justified in being certain that that quality is instantiated. Our phenomenal qualities do not seem to have a physical nature when we attend to them; hence, if subjects do bear the real acquaintance relationship to their phenomenal qualities, we have strong reason to think that physicalism is false. This chapter argues for real acquaintance on the grounds that its existence explains certain facts about our epistemic situation with respect to our phenomenal qualities. Tghe chapter then argues against physicalism, with particular reference to the phenomenal concept strategy.

Item Type:Book chapter
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Publisher statement:Goff, P. (2015). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism. In The Nature of Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception & Consciousness. Coates, P. & Coleman, S. Oxford Oxford University Press reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:25 November 2020
Date of first online publication:20 August 2015
Date first made open access:25 November 2020

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