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A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes

Alvarado, José Tomás; Tugby, Matthew

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Authors

José Tomás Alvarado



Contributors

Ludger Jansen
Editor

Petter Sandstad
Editor

Abstract

A combination of formal causation and natural-kind essentialism has good prospects. After all, natural-kind essentialists are under pressure to accept that natural kinds ground or formally cause the properties that characterize them. However, natural-kind essentialists are committed to the claim that natural kinds essentially depend on the properties that characterize them, such as the property of unit negative charge in the case of the electron kind. We argue that, given plausible assumptions about grounding and dependence, these claims clash. After presenting the problem, we consider and criticize ways in which natural-kind essentialists could try to avoid it.

Citation

Alvarado, J. T., & Tugby, M. (2021). A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes. In L. Jansen, & P. Sandstad (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation (201-221). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821

Acceptance Date Dec 15, 2020
Online Publication Date Mar 22, 2021
Publication Date 2021
Deposit Date Jan 6, 2021
Publicly Available Date Sep 8, 2022
Publisher Routledge
Pages 201-221
Series Title Routledge Studies in Metaphysics
Book Title Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation
Chapter Number 10
ISBN 9780367341206
DOI https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821
Keywords Natural Kinds, Essentialism, Formal Causation, Grounding, Essential Dependence

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