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What Counts as a 'Good Metaphysical Language'?

Miller, J. T. M. (2021) 'What Counts as a 'Good Metaphysical Language'?', in The Language of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-118. Mind Association Occasional Series.

Abstract

The objectively best language is intended to refer to some metaphysically privileged language that ‘carves reality at its joints’ perfectly. That is, it is the kind of language that various ‘metaphysical deflationists’ have argued is impossible. One common line of argument amongst deflationists is that we have no means to compare languages that all express true facts about the world in such a way to decide which is ‘better’. For example, the language is physics is not objectively better than the language of economics, as each language has the semantic purpose of expressing some domain of truths about the world inexpressible in the other language, and therefore neither could be ‘objectively best’. This chapter argues that metaphysical deflationists have failed to recognize a distinction between fine- and coarse-grained semantic purposes of languages, and that a recognition of that distinction provides us grounds to compare languages to see which is objectively best. It argues that once we recognize the distinction between fine- and coarse-grained semantic purposes, then we can see that it is relative to the coarse-grained purpose that we must compare putative objectively best ontological languages.

Item Type:Book chapter
Full text:Publisher-imposed embargo until 10 June 2023.
(AM) Accepted Manuscript
File format - PDF
(249Kb)
Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780192895332.001.0001/oso-9780192895332-chapter-7
Publisher statement:The Language of Ontology edited by J. T. M. Miller, 2021, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780192895332.001.0001/oso-9780192895332
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:04 October 2021
Date of first online publication:10 June 2021
Date first made open access:10 June 2023

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