Getting the Better of the Bargain: Technical Intelligence, Arms Sales, and Anglo-Israeli Relations 1967–1974

Abstract

This analysis explores the nature of Anglo-Israeli intelligence relations between 1967 and 1974, focusing in particular on how the legacy of the British mandate in Palestine, the influence of senior British diplomats, as well as wider commercial interests shaped attempts by intelligence officials on both sides to move this relationship beyond the purely functional. Whilst Israel looked to barter access to recently captured Soviet equipment for greater collaboration with the British in weapons development and arms sales, London demurred. Despite the urging of some in Whitehall, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office limited any collaboration to functional exchanges and kept them firmly in the shadows. The aftermath of the October 1973 war revealed the price paid by Britain. With Israel now dependent on Washington for the bulk of its military equipment, London’s ability to exercise any influence over Tel Aviv in reaching an accommodation with its Arab neighbours diminished greatly.