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Informational price cascades and non-aggregation of asymmetric information in experimental asset markets

Shachat, Jason; Srinivasan, Anand

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Authors

Anand Srinivasan



Abstract

We report on experimental markets which generate an abject failure of the aggregation of asymmetric information. While realized prices have zero correlation with fundamental values, surprisingly, these are not highly volatile. The non-aggregation of information manifests as prices which lock in to home grown norms that we call informational price cascades. Our results are in stark contrast to previous experiments testing fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium under asymmetric information and others examining social learning in asset markets when there is a rational market maker. Our experiments incorporate the asset and information structures from the latter into the decentralized private information setting and double auction trading mechanism of the former. Information only starts to aggregate when either each private signal is revealed to half of the traders or all private signals are simultaneously released early in the asset's issue.

Citation

Shachat, J., & Srinivasan, A. (2022). Informational price cascades and non-aggregation of asymmetric information in experimental asset markets. Journal of Behavioral Finance, 23(4), 388-407. https://doi.org/10.1080/15427560.2022.2081970

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 3, 2022
Online Publication Date Jun 15, 2022
Publication Date 2022
Deposit Date Mar 15, 2022
Publicly Available Date Mar 7, 2023
Journal Journal of Behavioral Finance
Print ISSN 1542-7560
Electronic ISSN 1542-7579
Publisher Taylor and Francis Group
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 23
Issue 4
Pages 388-407
DOI https://doi.org/10.1080/15427560.2022.2081970
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1212018

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