Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts

Uckelman, Sara L.

doi:10.26686/ajl.v19i4.7542

Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts

Uckelman, Sara L.

Authors

Dr Sara Uckelman s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

In [4], Kosterec claims to provide "model-theoretic proofs" of certain theses involving the normal modal operators and and the truth-in- ction (a la Lewis) operator F which he then goes on to show have coun- terexamples in Kripke models. He concludes from this that the embedding of normal modal logic under the truth-in-ction operator is unsound. We show instead that it is the \model-theoretic proofs" that are themselves unsound, involving illicit substitution, a subtle error that nevertheless al- lows us to draw an important conclusion about intensional contexts (such as ctional contexts) and semantic equivalences. [[4] Milos Kosterec. On modality in ction. Synthese, 199:13543-13567, 2021.]

Citation

Uckelman, S. L. (2022). Fictional Modality and the Intensionality of Fictional Contexts. Australasian journal of logic, 19(4), 124-132. https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i4.7542

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jun 8, 2022
Online Publication Date	Sep 22, 2022
Publication Date	2022
Deposit Date	Jun 14, 2022
Publicly Available Date	Dec 5, 2022
Journal	The Australasian Journal of Logic
Publisher	Australasian Association of Logic and Victoria University of Wellington
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	19
Issue	4
Article Number	1
Pages	124-132
DOI	https://doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i4.7542