Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory

Cowie, Christopher

doi:10.5840/jphil2023120927

Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory

Cowie, Christopher

Authors

Dr Christopher Cowie christopher.d.cowie@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

Moral error theory has many troubling and counterintuitive consequences. It entails, for example, that actions we ordinarily think of as obviously wrong are not wrong at all. This simple observation is at the heart of much opposition to error theory. I provide a new defense against it. The defense is based on the impossibility of finding satisfying solutions to a wide range of puzzles and paradoxes in moral philosophy. It is a consequence of this that if any moral claims are true, then a lot of highly troubling and counterintuitive moral claims must be in their number. This means that troubling and counterintuitive moral claims are everybody’s problem—not just error theorists’, but also their opponents’. Indeed, there is a sense in which this shared problem is worse for the opponents of error theory than for error theorists themselves.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2023). Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 120(9), 457-483. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120927

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jul 20, 2022
Publication Date	2023-09
Deposit Date	Jul 21, 2022
Publicly Available Date	Oct 1, 2024
Journal	The Journal of Philosophy
Print ISSN	0022-362X
Electronic ISSN	1939-8549
Publisher	Journal of Philosophy
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	120
Issue	9
Pages	457-483
DOI	https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120927
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1197105
Publisher URL	https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil