We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.

Durham Research Online
You are in:

Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias

Holroyd, Jules and Puddifoot, Katherine (2020) 'Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias.', in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. New York: Routledge.


Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are called “epistemic injustices.” Chapter 6 examines the ways in which implicit biases have been implicated in a range of epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustice, epistemic appropriation, and epistemic exploitation.

Item Type:Book chapter
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Download PDF
Publisher Web site:
Publisher statement:This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind on 09 April 2020, available online:
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:11 August 2022
Date of first online publication:09 April 2020
Date first made open access:11 August 2022

Save or Share this output

Look up in GoogleScholar