Holroyd, Jules and Puddifoot, Katherine (2020) 'Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias.', in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. New York: Routledge.
Abstract
Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are called “epistemic injustices.” Chapter 6 examines the ways in which implicit biases have been implicated in a range of epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustice, epistemic appropriation, and epistemic exploitation.
| Item Type: | Book chapter |
|---|---|
| Full text: | (AM) Accepted Manuscript Download PDF (359Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615 |
| Publisher statement: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind on 09 April 2020, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138092235 |
| Date accepted: | No date available |
| Date deposited: | 11 August 2022 |
| Date of first online publication: | 09 April 2020 |
| Date first made open access: | 11 August 2022 |
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