Holroyd, Jules and Puddifoot, Katherine (2020) 'Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias.', in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. New York: Routledge.
Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are called “epistemic injustices.” Chapter 6 examines the ways in which implicit biases have been implicated in a range of epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustice, epistemic appropriation, and epistemic exploitation.
|Item Type:||Book chapter|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615|
|Publisher statement:||This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind on 09 April 2020, available online: http://www.routledge.com/9781138092235|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||11 August 2022|
|Date of first online publication:||09 April 2020|
|Date first made open access:||11 August 2022|
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