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Timeless Freedom in Kant: Transcendental Freedom and Things-in-Themselves

Saunders, Joe

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Abstract

This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental idealism. And the third is to reject both Kant's claim about the timelessness of freedom and also transcendental idealism itself.

Citation

Saunders, J. (2022). Timeless Freedom in Kant: Transcendental Freedom and Things-in-Themselves. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 39(3), 275-292. https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.05

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 23, 2022
Online Publication Date Jul 1, 2022
Publication Date 2022-07
Deposit Date Sep 12, 2022
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal History of Philosophy Quarterly
Print ISSN 0740-0675
Electronic ISSN 2152-1026
Publisher University of Illinois Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 39
Issue 3
Pages 275-292
DOI https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.05

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