Saunders, Joe (2022) 'Timeless Freedom in Kant: Transcendental Freedom and Things-in-Themselves.', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 39 (3). pp. 275-292.
Abstract
This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental idealism. And the third is to reject both Kant's claim about the timelessness of freedom and also transcendental idealism itself.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Full text: | Publisher-imposed embargo until 01 July 2023. (AM) Accepted Manuscript File format - PDF (236Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.05 |
| Date accepted: | 23 March 2022 |
| Date deposited: | 12 September 2022 |
| Date of first online publication: | 01 July 2022 |
| Date first made open access: | 01 July 2023 |
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