Against Relational Value

James, Simon P.

doi:10.5840/harvardreview20228645

Against Relational Value

James, Simon P.

Authors

Professor Simon James s.p.james@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

In some environmental circles, talk of relational values is very much in fashion. It is said that we must think in terms of such values if we are to understand how such things as canyons, mangroves, and coral reefs matter to people. But that is bad advice. Appeals to relational values are typically misleading in several respects. Granted, those who make such appeals often do so in order to make the important point that some values are neither intrinsic nor instrumental in form; but that point can be made more clearly by referring to other concepts, such as that of constitutive value. To this objection, some may respond that appeals to relational value are nonetheless useful. However, as things stand, their usefulness remains unproven.

Citation

James, S. P. (2022). Against Relational Value. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 29, 45-54. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20228645

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Aug 9, 2022
Publication Date	2022
Deposit Date	Oct 3, 2022
Publicly Available Date	Oct 5, 2022
Journal	The Harvard Review of Philosophy
Print ISSN	1062-6239
Electronic ISSN	2153-9154
Publisher	Philosophy Documentation Center
Peer Reviewed	Not Peer Reviewed
Volume	29
Pages	45-54
DOI	https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20228645