The Pleasure Thesis in the Eudemian Ethics

Bonasio, G.

doi:10.1353/hph.2022.0051

The Pleasure Thesis in the Eudemian Ethics

Bonasio, G.

Authors

Dr Giulia Bonasio giulia.bonasio@durham.ac.uk
Assistant Professor

Abstract

This paper argues that in the Eudemian Ethics (EE), Aristotle aims to prove the Pleasure Thesis (PT). According to the Pleasure Thesis, happiness is the most pleasant thing of all. Through a reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT, this paper shows that happiness is most pleasant for three reasons: (1) it is pleasant by definition; (2) it is constituted by the most pleasant activities (virtuous actions and contemplation); (3) it is pleasant by nature. A reconstruction of the argument in favor of PT is philosophically interesting not only in order to better understand the argument in the EE—and in particular the debated status and role of NE VII/EE VI.11–14—but also insofar as it sheds light on the relation between the pleasant and the good.

Citation

Bonasio, G. (2022). The Pleasure Thesis in the Eudemian Ethics. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 60(4), 521-536. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0051

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	May 25, 2021
Online Publication Date	Oct 7, 2022
Publication Date	2022-10
Deposit Date	Jun 7, 2021
Publicly Available Date	Oct 11, 2022
Journal	Journal of the History of Philosophy
Print ISSN	0022-5053
Electronic ISSN	1538-4586
Publisher	Johns Hopkins University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	60
Issue	4
Pages	521-536
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2022.0051