Marsiliani, L. and Renstrom, T. I. (2007) 'Political institutions and economic growth.', Economics of governance., 8 (3). pp. 233-261.
Abstract
We analyze the impact of micro-founded political institutions on economic growth in an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour- and capital taxes finance the public good and a public input. The benchmark institution is a parliament, where all decisions are taken. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. We compare this constitution to delegation of decisionmaking, where a spending minister (elected in parliament or appointed by the largest party). Delegation of decisionmaking tends to yield lower growth, mainly due to the occurrence of production inefficiency.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Voting, Bargaining, Taxation, Endogenous growth, Overlapping generations. |
| Full text: | Full text not available from this repository. |
| Publisher Web site: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0038-z |
| Date accepted: | No date available |
| Date deposited: | No date available |
| Date of first online publication: | May 2007 |
| Date first made open access: | No date available |
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