Lowe, E. J. (2003) 'Identity, individuality, and unity.', Philosophy., 78 (3). pp. 321-337.
Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that ‘Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined’.
|Keywords:||Identity, Individuality, Unity.|
|Full text:||(VoR) Version of Record|
Download PDF (81Kb)
|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0031819103000329|
|Publisher statement:||(c) 2003 The Royal Institute of Philosophy|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||04 July 2008|
|Date of first online publication:||No date available|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
Save or Share this output
|Look up in GoogleScholar|