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Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games

Driessen, T.S.H.; Paulusma, D.

Authors

T.S.H. Driessen



Abstract

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.

Citation

Driessen, T., & Paulusma, D. (2001). Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 53(1), 35-49. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000099

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Apr 1, 2001
Deposit Date Oct 13, 2009
Journal Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Print ISSN 1432-2994
Electronic ISSN 1432-5217
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 53
Issue 1
Pages 35-49
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860000099
Keywords Cooperative game, Poset, Probability distribution, Shapley value.
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1555854


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